Article abstract
This paper argues that there are distinct parallels between changes to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act enacted by Bill C-31 (2012) , in particular the Designated Foreign National regime (DFN), and Australia's treatment of asylum seekers who arrive by boat. It is contended that recent Australian history and policy demonstrate the perils of adopting an ideology of control and exclusion toward asylum seekers instead of a politics of hospitality, and that Australia's present political climate provides a stark and salutary warning to Canada, as it follows a similar path of securitization. The paper first explains what is meant by a politics of hospitality. In Part I, it analyzes Australia's attitude toward, and its treatment of, asylum seekers, focusing in particular on the period since 1989. It is argued that Australia's inhospitable stance toward asylum seekers has had discernible negative outcomes that provide important lessons for Canada. Part II provides a brief historical overview of Canadian policy toward asylum seekers, followed by an analysis of the DFN regime with reference to international law. It then argues that the DFN provisions contravene the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The paper concludes by suggesting that Canada is at risk of following Australia's security-oriented, inhospitable stance toward asylum seekers. parallels between changes to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act enacted by Bill C-31 (2012) , in particular the Designated Foreign National regime (DFN), and Australia's treatment of asylum seekers who arrive by boat. It is contended that recent Australian history and policy demonstrate the perils of adopting an ideology of control and exclusion toward asylum seekers instead of a politics of hospitality, and that Australia's present political climate provides a stark and salutary warning to Canada, as it follows a similar path of securitization. The paper first explains what is meant by a politics of hospitality. In Part I, it analyzes Australia's attitude toward, and its treatment of, asylum seekers, focusing in particular on the period since 1989. It is argued that Australia's inhospitable stance toward asylum seekers has had discernible negative outcomes that provide important lessons for Canada. Part II provides a brief historical overview of Canadian policy toward asylum seekers, followed by an analysis of the DFN regime with reference to international law. It then argues that the DFN provisions contravene the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The paper concludes by suggesting that Canada is at risk of following Australia's security-oriented, inhospitable stance toward asylum seekers.
Cet article soutient qu'il y a des similarités distinctes entre les modifications apportées à la Loi sur l'immigration et la protection des réfugiés, promulguée par le Projet de Loi C-31 (2012), en particulier le régime de l'Étranger Désigné, et le traitement que réserve l'Australie aux demandeurs d'asile arrivés par bateau. En effet, l'histoire et la politique australiennes des dernières années mettent en lumière l'écueil que représente l'adoption d'une idéologie de contrôle et d'exclusion envers les demandeurs d'asile, par opposition à une politique fondée sur des valeurs d'hospitalité. Le climat politique actuel de l'Australie constitue en cela un avertissement sévère, mais salutaire pour le Canada qui semble s'engager dans cette même voie ré-pressive de sécurisation territoriale. L'article explique d'abord ce qu'on entend par politique d'hospitalité. Ensuite, en première partie, il fait l'analyse de l'attitude et du traitement que réserve l'Australie aux demandeurs d'asile, se concentrant sur la période depuis 1989. L'attitude inhospitalière qu'a adoptée l'Australie a eu des effets né-fastes dont le Canada devrait tirer des leçons. La deuxième partie fait un bref historique des politiques canadiennes envers les demandeurs d'asile, suivi par une analyse du régime de l'Étranger Dé-signé en regard du droit international. Enfin, l'article soutient que les clauses du régime de l'Étranger Désigné contreviennent à la Charte ca
Introduction
In 2009 and 2010, 575 Sri Lankan asylum seekers arrived on boats off the coast of British Columbia. 1 Canada responded by enacting Bill C-31, 2 which, inter alia, empowers the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration to declare that particular non-citizens are Designated Foreign Nationals (DFNs). 3 Persons subject to designation are liable to a suite of measures, including mandatory detention with limited review, and the inability to apply for permanent residence for five years from the date of designation, even if a genuine claim for protection is found to exist. The Canadian response bears striking parallels to Australia's introduction of mandatory 1 and indefinite detention of non-citizens following the arrival of some 735 Cambodian asylum seekers between 1989 and 1994. 4 Canada's DFN regime and Australia's system of mandatory detention (and offshore processing of asylum seekers) are examples of the shift among Western nations toward framing outsiders as potential security threats. 5 Detention of non-citizens is perhaps the most visible manifestation of the securitization 6 of migration law. 7 Increasingly, asylum seekers are constructed in political discourse as a threat associated with criminality, in part to create "the spectacle of being in control." 8 The language of burden sharing is being "transformed into a language of threats to the security of states" 9 that in turn operates to justify the erosion of core international law principles such as non-refoulement, 10 as well as carceral treatment of non-citizens. This paper argues that the DFN provisions are antithetical to a politics of hospitality and infringe both the Charter and principles of interna- Following the Copenhagen School, "securitization" may be understood as the framing of a person or object as an existential threat through speech acts, which in turn justifies the use of exceptional measures (see Barry Buzan, Ole Waever & Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998) at 23-24). 7 See Dauvergne, "Less Brave New World", supra note 5. Chimni, "Globalization", supra note 5 at 252. In his view, the ideology of humanitarianism operates to "establish and sustain global relations of domination," utilizing the discourse of human rights to justify the use of force and the imposition of a neo-liberal economic and political agenda (ibid at 244). Chimni has also argued that commitment to principles of deliberative democracy is crucial to reform of the international refugee system (see "Reforming the International Refugee Regime: A Dialogic Model" (2001) 14:2 J Refugee Studies 151). Seyla Benhabib has similarly espoused the virtues of discourse ethics in resolving the tension between sovereignty and human rights that lies at the heart of contemporary debates over policies toward asylum seekers (see "Transformations of Citizenship: The European Union" in Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 129). tional law. Moreover, it is suggested that recent Australian history and policy provide a stark and salutary warning to Canada concerning the perils of adopting an ideology of control and exclusion toward asylum seekers instead of a politics of hospitality. 11 Australia is a pertinent comparator because of its decades-long experience with mandatory detention and offshore processing, to which Canadian politicians have referred in justifying Bill C-31. 12 The advent of mandatory detention in Australia engendered a realization on the part of some politicians that the asylum seeker issue could be leveraged for political gain. 13 Ever since, measures designed to exploit this potential, under the guise of protecting Australia's interests, have emerged with alarming frequency. 14 Billions of dollars have been spent constructing offshore processing centres to detain asylum seekers while their claims are processed, 15 despite the fact that most boat arrivals are eventually found to be refugees and admitted to Australia. 16 The management of these facilities by private corporations 17 link between transnational capital and the international refugee system. 18 Numerous reports attest to the psychological harm caused to detainees by long-term detention. 19 Yet the boats still come.
The DFN regime, which forms part of the IRPA, constitutes a troubling step toward the militaristic Australian approach. To be sure, designation of particular non-citizens is not the only example of Canada's shift away from a politics of hospitality. A recent report prepared by the Harvard Immigration and Refugee Law Clinical Program analyzing the Canada-US Safe Third Country Agreement 20 and Canada's Multiple Borders Strategy 21 concluded, "Canada is systematically closing its borders to asylum seekers and avoiding its refugee protection obligations under domestic and international law." 22 Nevertheless, the DFN provisions enact a securitizing logic that carries potentially destructive consequences for designees and Canadian society. In this respect, Canada may be likened to Australia between 1989 and 1992, when designation and mandatory de-18 Chimni argues that the flow of transnational capital plays a causative role in creating the conditions from which refugees and asylum seekers seek protection ("Globalization", supra note 5 It is important to clarify what is meant by a politics of hospitality. In Perpetual Peace, Kant argued that a "state of peace among men living in close proximity" must be established through the creation and acceptance of a form of civil constitution. 24 He proposed three forms of constitutionthe most relevant of which for present purposes is ius cosmopoliticum, which conforms "to the rights of world citizenship, sofar as men and nations stand in mutually influential relations as citizens of a universal nation of men." 25 Kant's "Third Definitive Article for a Perpetual Peace" stipulates that "[c]osmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality." 26 Kant defines hospitality as the right of an alien not to be treated as an enemy upon his arrival in another's country. If it can be done without destroying him, he can be turned away; but as long as he behaves peaceably he cannot be treated as an enemy. 27 The right is not to remain indefinitely within the borders of a nation exercising hospitality; such a right arises only through "a special, charitable agreement" granted by the state. 28 This limitation is a product of Kant's belief in the importance of boundaries: that a world federation, as opposed to a world government, is a necessary condition for peaceful coexistence. 29 The principles of cosmopolitanism and hospitality stress the value of what might be termed "inter-jurisdictional respect"; that is, state and individual respect for the legal subjecthood of persons who encounter the legal and political apparatuses of another jurisdiction. 30 Seyla Benhabib has described cosmopolitanism as "the emergence of norms that ought to govern relations among individuals in a global civil society," while "hospitality is of interest because it touches on the quintessential case of an indi- 23 See Part I(A), below. tain exceptions and even derogation in the face of existential threats. 35 What is not permitted, though, is the implementation of processing regimes that designate claimants, based on their mode of arrival, for longterm detention and severely limited civil rights. From a cosmopolitan perspective, long-term detention may be seen as an infringement of the obligation not to cause destruction to a person who arrives at the borders of a polity; the detained person is not positively sent away, but neither is he or she permitted to enter as a welcome guest. Of course, most if not all asylum seekers are not merely seeking temporary sojourn. However, adopting Benhabib's expansive view of the right to hospitality, persons should not be subjected to destructive treatment by reason of their attempt to seek membership within a particular bounded community.
At the international level, the duty of non-destruction inherent within Kant's formulation of the obligation to accord hospitality is reflected in the non-refoulement obligation in article 33 of the Refugee Convention. The extended form of this obligation, in which enemy treatment is understood as encompassing not only denial of entry but also punitive or carceral treatment by reason of one's attempt to seek entry, is reflected in the Refugee Convention's injunction in article 31(1) against penalizing refugees "on account of their illegal entry or presence ... provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence," as well as in the prohibition on applying unnecessary restrictions to the movement of refugees. 36 While provisions such as articles 31 and 33 of the Refugee Convention are oriented toward upholding the rights of individuals, it is important to recall that refugee law assists not only asylum seekers, but also nations because "it accommodates the claims of those whose arrival cannot be dependably stopped, even as it vindicates the exclusionary norm in relation to other would-be entrants." 37 In other words, refugee law-which may be seen, in It seems to dictate that absolute hospitality should break with the law of hospitality as right or duty ... [because] absolute hospitality requires that I open up my home and that I give not only to the foreigner ... but to the absolute, unknown, anonymous other, and that I give place to them, that I let them come ... without asking of them either reciprocity (entering into a pact) or even their names. The law of absolute hospitality commands a break with hospitality by right, with law or justice as rights (supra note 32 at 25). 35 See Benhabib, "The Rights of Others", supra note 9 at 35-36. This limitation is also contained in the Refugee Convention, supra note 10, art 1(F) of which excludes certain classes of persons from protection on the basis of crimes committed or threats posed to the host state's security. 36 See Refugee Convention, supra note 10, art 31(2). Also relevant is the requirement that states provide lawful refugees with travel documents (see ibid, art 28).
part, as a legal instantiation of the principles of hospitality and cosmopolitanism-offers a way of addressing the tension between sovereignty and human rights 38 in the context of transnational migration.
Part I analyzes Australian policies toward asylum seekers. It begins with a historical overview in order to contextualize more recent developments. It then parses the changes since 1989 with a view toward demonstrating the lessons to be learned by Canada from Australia's inhospitable approach to asylum seekers. Part II analyzes Canada's position vis-à-vis asylum seekers, with a particular emphasis on the DFN regime. It begins with a brief foray into the history of Canada's treatment of asylum seekers. It then analyzes the mechanics of the DFN regime by reference to principles of international law. Lastly, a detailed argument is presented as to why the DFN regime contravenes the Charter. The paper concludes by suggesting that through the creation of Bill C-31, Canada risks adopting Australia's security-oriented, inhospitable stance toward asylum seekers.
I. Exclusion and Detention: Australia's Treatment of Asylum Seekers

A. A Legacy of Inhospitality
Definitional uncertainty regarding citizenship and an inhospitable attitude toward non-white foreigners (and Indigenous Australians) is a constitutive aspect of Australian law and culture. The drafters of the Australia Constitution 39 deliberately refrained from defining the meaning and parameters of citizenship-at least in part to exclude non-white persons as constituent members of the Australian polity. 40 Instead, the matter was left to Parliament, whose first legislative measure post-Federation was the Immigration Restriction Act 1901 (Cth). That Act spelled out a distinct policy of racial bias in favour of white European immigrants-the infamous White Australia policy. 41 While Australia admitted large numbers of 38 The "paradox of democratic legitimacy," according to Benhabib. "The Rights of Others", supra note 9 at 47. Attitudes toward refugees shifted in the 1970s. The dismantling of the White Australia policy seemed to herald a different attitude toward migrants; particularly those seeking protection. The arrival of some 2,000 Vietnamese asylum seekers by boat between 1976 and 1981 prompted the establishment of formal procedures to determine refugee status; those measures did not involve mandatory detention, temporary visas or interdiction of boats. 44 Part of the response was the establishment of a Comprehensive Plan of Action to facilitate the transfer of tens of thousands of Vietnamese nationals to Australia. 45 It was during this period that the term "multiculturalism," which was borrowed from Canada, entered the Australian cultural and political lexicon. 46 The latter part of the 1980s saw a retreat from hospitality in Australia. The increasingly multicultural nature of Australian societygenerated in no small part by the generosity demonstrated toward Vietnamese refugees in the 1970s-reignited latent concerns over the composition of the Australian population. 47 This anxiety, in conjunction with the shift in global power relations and conceptions of security engendered by the end of the Cold War, 48 contributed to a climate in which the Cambodian asylum seekers who began to arrive on Australian shores in 1989 "were offered not refuge but prolonged detention." 49 The detention of the Cambodians was made possible by legislation passed in 1989, 50 which enabled the detention of persons on board a vessel fairs 279 at 281). A precursor to the Immigration Restriction Act 1901 was Victoria's Act to Make Provision for Certain Immigrants 1855 (Vic), which defined "immigrant" as any adult male of Chinese descent (see Crock, "Alien Fears", supra note 40 at 20).
at the time of its arrival in port if "an authorized officer reasonably believe [d] " that the person was seeking to enter Australia in circumstances in which the person would become an illegal entrant, for such time "until the departure of the vessel from its last port of call in Australia." 51 Officially, the motivation for the introduction of the discretionary detention regime was to ensure that persons arriving by boat were not forced to "return to sea in unseaworthy vessels." 52 Whether or not the amendment was in fact motivated by compassion, it became the vehicle by which Australia began to construct and treat asylum seekers not only as undesirable others, but as criminals and security threats to be deterred and detained.
B. Detention: Mandatory and Indefinite
In the early 1990s, Australia experienced a dramatic increase (by Australian standards) in the number of asylum claims by people who had arrived by boat. 53 By June 1992, 478 people were in immigration detention: 54 421 of those people were boat arrivals, 306 of whom were Cambodian. 55 In the same year, lawyers of thirty-six Cambodians whose applications for asylum had been rejected instituted proceedings to challenge the rejec- While the premises were unfenced, detainees were not permitted to leave the centre and were required to report daily to Australian Protective Services (see ibid). 55 See ibid. By the middle of 1993, asylum seekers who had arrived in 1989 and who were still in custody had experienced an average of 1,331 days in detention. Those who were no longer in custody had been detained for an average of 974 days. See Mary Crock, "Border Refugee Claimants at a Glance" in Mary Crock, ed, Protection or Punishment:
The Detention of Asylum-Seekers in Australia (Sydney: Federation Press, 1993) xx at xxi.
tions. 56 Despite judicial orders setting aside the decisions rejecting the applicants' claims, Parliament pre-empted a scheduled application for their release by passing the Migration Amendment Act 1992. 57 That 1992 Act introduced mandatory detention into Australian law. 58 In doing so, the 1992 Act signalled a profound shift away from the hospitality demonstrated in the 1970s toward a securitizing approach that has influenced Australian policy ever since. Crucially, the 1992 Act established the class of "designated person," defined in part by a temporally specific provision applying the regime to non-citizens who arrived on boats between 19 November 1989 and 1 December 1992 59 -a definition that was clearly designed specifically to capture the Cambodians who had arrived in that period. 60 In Chu Kheng Lim, which challenged the detention of the thirty-six Cambodians and the provisions of the 1992 Act, the High Court held that the detention of the asylum seekers up until the passage of the 1992 Act was unlawful by reason of the very provision under which detention of designated illegal entrants had been introduced in 1989. 61 However, the Court was unanimous that the mandatory detention regime introduced by the 1992 Act was a valid exercise of the Commonwealth's power over "aliens" under section 51(xix) of the Australian Constitution. 62 The result of Chu Kheng Lim was that the plaintiffs remained in immigration detention. 63 In 1997, the United Nations Human Rights Committee found in A v. Australia 64 that the continued detention of the Cambodian applicant by Australian authorities for four years constituted arbitrary detention contrary to article 9, paragraph 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 65 In 1994, more comprehensive amendments to the detention regime came into effect. 66 Mandatory detention was extended to all "unlawful non-citizens" and the 273-day limit on such detention was removed. In essence, the changes coming into force in 1994 created a binary distinction between "lawful" and "unlawful" non-citizens: the former were, inter alia, non-citizens who held a valid visa; the latter were non-citizens in the miadmission and deportation of aliens and [were] not, of their nature, part of the judicial power of the Commonwealth" (ibid at 119-20). This being said, the Court struck down s 54R, which provided that "a court 'is not to order the release from custody of a designated person,'" as an impermissible encroachment upon the judicial process (ibid at 121). 63 In October 1993, the Minister for Immigration offered Cambodian asylum seekers in Australia the opportunity to obtain permanent residence if they agreed to return to Cambodia (at Australia's expense) for one year, after which time they would be able to return to Australia (at their own expense) if they had a sponsor who would provide accommodation and financial support for six months. . Furthermore, the Committee in A v Australia held that the striking down of s 54R in Chu Kheng Lim did not insulate the mandatory detention provisions in the 1992 Act from scrutiny because "court review of the lawfulness of detention under article 9, paragraph 4, which must include the possibility of ordering release, is not limited to mere compliance of the detention with domestic law," whereas under the Migration Act 1958, review was, in fact, "limited to an assessment of whether [the applicant] was indeed a 'designated person' within the meaning of the Migration Amendment Act" (A v Australia, supra note 64 at para 9.5). The Committee held, pursuant to the ICCPR, supra note 65, art 2, para 3, that Australia was obliged to provide A with "adequate compensation for the length of the detention to which A was subjected" (A v Australia, supra note 64 at para 11 der this policy, the territories of Christmas Island, Ashmore and Cartier Islands, and the Cocos (Keeling) Islands 81 were excised from Australia's migration zone, and agreements were reached with the governments of Nauru and Papua New Guinea to process asylum seekers on Nauru and Manus Island (PNG) instead of Australia. 82 To implement this strategy, the government adopted a military-style operation of intercepting boats; either turning them back to Indonesia or sending them to Australian offshore processing centres. 83 Persons arriving at an "excised offshore place" were denied the ability to make a valid application for a visa, including protection visas, without approval by the Minister. 84 A more hospitable approach to asylum seekers appeared likely with the 2007 election of the Labor Party, which had campaigned in part on a platform of ending the Pacific Solution. In early 2008, Labor resettled the last 21 asylum seekers on Nauru in Australia and announced that Nauru and Manus Island would no longer be used as processing centres. TPVs for persons found to be refugees were also abandoned. 85 (2) requires the Minister to have regard to the "national interest" in making a designation, which in turn requires consideration of whether the country has provided assurances that it "will not expel or return a person taken to the country under section 198AD to another country where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion" (ibid, s 198AB(3)(a)(i)).
al processing centre. 93 A challenge to the provision conferring power on the Minister to designate regional processing centres, and to the designation of PNG as such a centre, was recently rejected by the High Court. 94 The current Liberal-National Government took power in 2013 on the back of a campaign that defiantly eschewed a politics of hospitality and promised to "stop the boats." 95 Among the new government's first measures was the implementation of its Operation Sovereign Borders policy, which centres on a Pacific Solution-style "military-led response to combat people smuggling and to protect our borders." 96 The key component of the policy is "external disruption"; 97 that is, forcibly turning back boats. 98 Other measures include paying Indonesian villagers for information, purchasing unseaworthy boats, increasing the number of Australian Federal Police in overseas missions, and bolstering Australia's border protection fleet. 99 Perhaps the most striking aspect of the government's recent approach is the return to a post-Tampa ideology of control and framing of asylum seekers as undesirable others. The newly dubbed Minister for Immigration and Border Protection issued a directive in October 2013 to all federal public servants to use the term "illegals" when referring to asylum seekers. 101 The government has adopted an approach of deliberate obfuscation concerning its policy on "irregular maritime arrivals," 102 as well as the number of boats that have been successfully "disrupted" and those that have made it to Australian waters or the mainland. 103 Nevertheless, reports have emerged of asylum seekers being forcibly returned to Indonesia using lifeboats specially purchased for the task by the government. 104 Waiting times for initial review by the UNHCR in Indonesia now exceed twelve months. 105 Moreover, allegations of abuse by the Australian Navy have been made by some of the people on board the disrupted vessels. 106 Most recently, a boat carrying 157 Tamil asylum seekers was intercepted off the coast of Christmas Island. The asylum seekers were transferred to an Australian Customs vessel, where they remained for three weeks in windowless rooms for some twenty-one hours a day, without access to le-THE TREATMENT OF ASYLUM SEEKERS 353 gal advice. 107 Eventually, the asylum seekers were briefly brought to Australia before being removed to Nauru. 108 In December 2014, the Australian government passed legislation 109 that, inter alia, reintroduces TPVs 110 (including restrictions on the countries which holders may visit 111 ); permits the Minister to set annual limits on the number of protection visas to be issued; 112 provides that nonrefoulement obligations under the Refugee Convention are irrelevant in respect of unlawful non-citizens; 113 and institutes a new fast-track system of refugee determination for unauthorized maritime arrivals. 114 
C. Lessons from Australia
Since the arrival of Cambodian asylum seekers in 1989, Australia has been at the vanguard of the international trend toward securitizing migration laws and treating asylum seekers as threats, rather than as people deserving protection (or at the very least, a proper process of determining claims for protection). This inhospitable approach may be seen as a continuation of, or vestigial link to, the White Australia policy and the control Australia "wishes to exert over its national identity." 115 It is also a response driven by political expediency-the language of protection is deployed not in the form of an offer to outsiders, but rather as an alleged means of ensuring the safety of the nation and its citizens. This section argues, first, that Australia's approach has not worked at the level of de- 107 As the vessel was interdicted outside of the migration zone as defined in section 5 of the Migration Act, the detention was purportedly legitimate pursuant to the Maritime Powers Act 2013 (Cth), s 72. 108 See "157 Tamil Asylum Seekers Sent from Curtin Detention Centre to Nauru", ABC News (2 August 2014), online: <www.abc.net.au/news/2014-08-02/tamil-asylum-seekerssent-to-nauru/5642972>. Australia now has more than two decades of experience with a mandatory detention scheme for people seeking refugee protection. Almost everybody seeking refugee protection is detained at some point. This system has not achieved its deterrence objectives. It has harmed many people and it has cost thousands of millions of dollars. 116 At the outset, it is to be observed that Australian data indicates that a high proportion of persons in immigration detention have legitimate claims for protection. 70 per cent of people detained on Nauru and Manus Island between 2001 and February 2008 were ultimately resettled in Australia or other countries. 117 Acceptance rates at Christmas Island were over 90 per cent in the period between July 1, 2009, and January 31, 2010. 118 These data suggest that a security-driven response to asylum seeker flows is somewhat excessive. While Canada does not presently conduct offshore processing, 119 the Australian experience suggests that Canada ought to seriously reconsider the extent to which it emulates Australian practices in respect of asylum seekers.
The UNHCR has stated that " [t] here is no empirical evidence that the threat of being detained deters irregular migration or discourages people from seeking asylum." 120 Drawing on research and government statements from around the world, the International Detention Coalition has found that asylum seekers generally have little understanding of the practices of destination states concerning asylum seekers; in any event, Richard Towle of UNHCR has argued that the higher number of people taking dangerous and exploitative sea journeys is a symptom of the grave human insecurity that refugees face at home and the risks they are compelled to take to find safety for their families. It is no coincidence that most boat people come from Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran and Sri Lanka-places that are suffering, or have recently emerged, from long periods of serious human insecurity (Phillips & Spinks, "Boat Arrivals in Australia", supra note 16 at 3, quoting UNHCR, Media Release, "AsylumSeekers: Let's Have a Mature Discussion" (13 September 2012), online: <www.unhcr.org.au/unhcr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id= 265:asylum-seekers-lets-have-a-mature-discussion&catid=35:news-amedia&Itemid=63>). 123 The influence of agents over those seeking their services does not mean that asylum seekers are aware of the risks involved in travelling to countries such as Australia and Canada; indeed, the limited available research suggests quite the opposite (see Spinks, Destination Anywhere?, supra note 122 at 16-17).
mate motivation for immigration detention, it would thus seem to rest on flawed assumptions regarding its efficacy, since, in Mary Crock's words, "[w]hile there are families striving to be reunited, while there are people caught in limbo yearning for a safe haven, the refugees will continue to batter at Australia's door." 126 There is no reason to think that the threat of detention is likely to function as a greater deterrent in Canada than in Australia.
The financial cost of immigration detention is breathtaking. Oxfam Australia has calculated that Australia spent over AUD$1 billion on offshore processing between 2001 and 2007. 127 Fewer than seventeen hundred people were processed during this period, meaning that the cost per person was in excess of AUD$500,000. 128 While the purpose of offshore processing (denial of access to the Australian legal system 129 and decreased visibility of detainees 130 ) means that economic efficiency is not the only relevant factor in assessing the offshore processing regime, the scale of the expense is evident seeing as the cost of onshore detention for the same period would have amounted to around 3.5 per cent of the cost of offshore processing. 131 In May 2013, the Immigration Department submitted evidence to a Senate estimates hearing that the cost of detention (offshore and onshore) for 2012-2013 would be approximately AUD$1.5 billion. 132 By way of comparison, the funds available to UNHCR operations in 2013 were USD$3.234 billion, while some 11.7 million people were under the organisation's mandate. 133 Expenditure of this magnitude by Western nations brings attention to the fact that internal conflicts, which give rise to flows of asylum seekers, "may be traced to shrinking shares of marginalized peoples in the globalization process" and the economic liberalization project of the post-Cold <www.abc.net.au/news/2014-03-24/people-smugglers-adapting-methods-to-combataustralian-policies/5342276>. 126 Crock, "Conflicting Visions", supra note 83 at 94. 127 See Bem et al, supra note 15 at 4. 128 See ibid. 129 See discussion of the Pacific Solution, above at 16. 130 136 Yet there is no evidence of a positive correlation between the spending and improvement of conditions in the centres; to the contrary-despite this degree of expenditure, the UNHCR's second report on the conditions at the Manus Island Regional Processing Centre found that "[p]hysical living conditions remain harsh" and "freedom of movement remains extremely limited" contrary to UNHCR's Detention Guidelines. 137 Given the disproportionate expense and poor standards of treatment reported in offshore Australian facilities, these findings reinforce why Canada would be well advised to avoid both building upon designation and mandatory detention, and the move to offshore processing.
The destructive impact of detention on those who are detained is manifest. 138 A litany of reports attests to the deleterious impact of long-term detention on asylum seekers. The Australian Human Rights Commission has drawn attention to the disturbingly high rates of self-harm, suicide, and generally poor mental health among asylum seekers. 139 Suicide Prevention Australia noted in 2011 that there were over 1,100 instances of threatened or actual self-harm, and at least five suicides by persons in detention-statistics that are "incomparable to any other situation or population." 140 A 2013 inquiry by the Australian Ombudsman found that be-tween July 1, 2010 and April 24, 2013, there were 11 deaths in immigration detention. 141 A 2014 inquiry into children in immigration detention heard evidence that 128 children had self-harmed in the preceding fifteen months. 142 A recent protest by detainees on Manus Island against the conditions of detention led to the death of one Iranian asylum seeker; 77 others were injured. 143 The impact of detention on asylum seekers supports the argument that detention amounts to a violation of the right to hospitality at both a moral and legal level. Morally, detention of non-enemies infringes the obligation to accord hospitality, even if persons are seeking permanent membership in a community rather than temporary sojourn. Legally, detention on a mandatory and indefinite basis without an assessment as to the necessity and proportionality of the purpose of such detention in the individual case, and without being brought promptly before a judicial or other independent authority amounts to arbitrary detention that is inconsistent with international human rights law. 144 In 2013, the UN Human Rights Committee in FKAG v. Australia 145 found that Australia's indefinite detention of persons subject to adverse security assessments breached articles 7 and 9(1), (2) and (4) Australia's culture and politics have also suffered from its inhospitality toward asylum seekers. Despite the nation's racist history, sovereignty has renewed its claim on the social consciousness in the form of xenophobia and callousness. Over the past twenty-five years, politicians have leveraged the asylum seeker issue for political gain, 147 and refugees have become the means by which politicians pander to unease over perceptions of a rapidly changing nation. 148 The secrecy that is inherent in the logic of securitization has resulted in attempts by government departments to conceal the various impacts of detention on detainees. 149 To maintain the position that its inhospitable policies are achieving their deterrence objective, the government has resorted to claiming that the aforementioned Sri Lankan asylum seekers who were kept on a customs vessel for some three weeks are in fact economic migrants liable to being returned to India. 150 assessment does not necessarily bring detention to an end; accordingly, article 9(4) was infringed. The cumulative impact of "the arbitrary character of the authors' detention, its protracted and/or indefinite duration, the refusal to provide information and procedural rights to the authors and the difficult conditions of detention are cumulatively inflicting serious psychological harm upon them, and constitute treatment contrary to article 7 of the Covenant. While it may be true that not all of the Sri Lankans meet the criteria for protection, the government's position is an example of a broader trend toward involuntary repatriation by states that are "unwilling to actualize the principle of burden sharing." 151 The rhetoric surrounding the introduction of Bill C-31 suggests that Canada is at risk of following a similar path. 152 Recent Australian history would indicate that Canada ought to eschew a politics that rests on the construction of asylum seekers as scapegoats in order to confront deeper concerns over national identity and economic inequality.
The point of drawing attention to the negative outcomes of immigration detention is not to suggest that borders do not matter, or that sovereignty is unimportant-the right of hospitality presupposes both the existence of boundaries and a commitment to sovereignty. Furthermore, in the context of boat arrivals, it must be acknowledged that most boats used by asylum seekers are not equipped for the type of journey being made, and as a consequence, people die. The SIEV X incident in late 2001, in which 353 asylum seekers drowned on their way to Australia, exemplifies this reality. 153 Thus, as Crock and Ghezelbash have pointed out, "stopping irregular migration by boat is a laudable policy objective." 154 What is not acceptable is a system that treats asylum seekers who do arrive by boat as enemies, by subjecting them to punishment and contraventions of international law. The shift in Australia toward securitizing migration, particularly forced migration, amounts to an inhospitable attempt to avoid addressing the needs of people who, in the eyes of proponents of such policies, have the temerity to seek protection at the doorstep without calling first to seek permission. This approach has had a demonstrably destructive effect not only on detainees, but also on the nation as a whole. In view of the recent enactment of Bill C-31 and the DFN regime, Canada ought to consider closely the lessons offered by the Australian regime when formulating future laws and policies concerning asylum seekers.
II. The DFN Regime: Protecting Canada's Immigration System?
A. A Mixed Legacy
Canada has never formally enacted an equivalent to the White Australia policy. However, at various points in its history it has evinced an equivalent attitude of antipathy toward non-white immigrants and asylum seekers. 155 The relevance of ethnicity to Canadian immigration policy in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is apparent in the longstanding Chinese head tax, 156 which continued in force until 1923 when it was replaced by legislation that blocked virtually all Chinese immigration until 1947. 157 The nervousness engendered by boat arrivals and refugees is evident in the passage of the Immigration Act 1910, 158 which conferred power on the federal government to prohibit the landing of immigrants "belonging to any race deemed unsuited to the climate or requirements of Canada," 159 as well as the infamous Komagata Maru and St. Louis incidents. 160 To be sure, Canada admitted hundreds of thousands of displaced Europeans in the wake of World War II, but the right to discriminate on the basis of race was upheld. 161 Furthermore, those who were admitted tended to accord with the prevailing Anglo-American con- 155 Like Australia, Canada's attitude toward refugees shifted in the 1970s. 164 In 1976, Canada enacted a new Immigration Act 165 that expressly recognized its obligations under the Refugee Convention, which it had ratified in 1969. 166 Between 1975 and 1981, Canada demonstrated an attitude of cosmopolitan hospitality by admitting some 77,000 refugees from Southeast Asia, along with several thousand refugees from Uganda and Chile; many of those admitted were privately sponsored by Canadian citizens. 167 Canada's generosity during this period, when it accepted more refugees per capita than any other nation, led to its receipt of the Nansen Medal-awarded to a country for the first time in history. 168 By the late 1980s, however, Canadian hospitality was threatened by a global upsurge in the number of refugees and undocumented migrants. 169 The arrival of Sikh asylum seekers by boat in Nova Scotia in 1987 appeared to confirm the "fear that Canada was in imminent danger of being overwhelmed by non-genuine refugee claimants." 170 rents and Detention Act. 172 This Act extended powers of detention, 173 limited access to the determination system, and established a new system of refugee determination utilizing adversarial hearings, the outcomes of which were non-appealable. 174 The arrival of 599 Chinese nationals off the coast of British Columbia in 1999 triggered another round of discussions concerning asylum seekers. A report issued by the House of Commons Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration framed the issue as one requiring a balance between refugee protection and border security. 175 However, the stated security concerns "were not centrally about terrorists or persons who pose major security threats," but rather dealt with "the economic impacts of people working illegally, of opportunistically drawing on the public purse, or of feathering the pockets of smugglers." 176 This assessment of the situation was not entirely unreasonable given that the majority of the boat arrivals were economic migrants. 177 The Committee viewed detention as a necessary component of Canada's immigration system, and its recommendations largely accorded with the prevailing detention provisions in the Immigration Act 1976. 178 Thus, when the IRPA first came into effect, detention remained discretionary and individualized, and regular reviews were required; 179 the number of persons in immigration detention did, however, increase sharply in the years following the introduction of IRPA. 180 Viewed in the context of Canada's historical nervousness over unauthorized boat arrivals, it is not especially surprising that the arrival of 575 Sri Lankan nationals in 2010 triggered public anxiety and a securitizing response on the part of the Canadian government. What is surprising is the extent to which Bill C-31-and particularly the DFN provisionsdepart from principles of hospitality and international law, as well as the Charter.
B. The DFN Regime
The progenitor of Bill C-31-Bill C-49 181 -was introduced in Parliament on October 21, 2010. That Bill lapsed with the dissolution of the 40th Parliament. 182 On June 16, 2011, a new bill, Bill C-4, was introduced. 183 In a manner reminiscent of the Australian legislation introducing the concept of designated persons and mandatory detention in the 1990s, "Bill C-4 was hastily drafted by the government when Canadians witnessed the spectre of two boats coming to the shores of British Columbia carrying some of the most damaged and wounded people on earth." 184 Putatively entitled the Preventing Human Smugglers from Abusing Canada's Immigration System Act, the Bill in fact targeted "those who turn to smugglers for assistance." 185 In 2012, the substantive provisions of Bill C-4 were incorporated within the omnibus Bill C-31, Protecting Canada's Immigration System Act.
The DFN regime introduced by Bill C-31 hinges on section 20.1 of IRPA, 186 which confers power on the Minister to "designate as an irregular arrival the arrival in Canada of a group of persons" on the basis that examinations for the purpose of determining identity and inadmissibility cannot be conducted in a timely manner, or because of a reasonable suspicion that their entry involved people smuggling (contrary to section 117(1)). 187 Section 20.1 does not on its face restrict the application of the DFN provisions to asylum seekers, although in reality "irregular arrivals" are virtually certain to be refugee claimants. While the Minister must have regard to "the public interest" 188 when making a designation, an opinion that the relevant criteria are established is a sufficient basis for designation. Furthermore, subsection (b) 189 enables designation by association, since it is sufficient that a person's arrival in Canada was as part of a group in circumstances that may have involved a contravention of section 117(1), irrespective of whether the person is deemed a legitimate asylum seeker. This may contravene international non-discrimination principles. 190 It also squares with a turn toward treating refugee claims as a matter of security, rather than a matter of human rights and immigraeng.pdf>. The disingenuousness of the title is made particularly clear when it is recalled that section 117(1) of IRPA, before it was amended by Bill C-31, already made it an offence to "organize, induce, aid or abet the coming into Canada of one or more persons who are not in possession of a visa, passport or other document required by this Act." Section 41 of Bill C-31 amended this provision to include recklessness as an alternative mens rea element.
tion. 191 From this perspective, inhospitable treatment of asylum seekers is framed as muscular state policy designed to protect the nation from external threats.
In a manner reminiscent of Australia's temporally specific definition of "designated person" in the 1992 Act, Bill C-31's transitional provisions enable the Minister to designate persons who arrived after March 31, 2009, which is prior to the arrival of the Sri Lankans. 192 The regime applies to adults and persons who are over the age of sixteen on the date of arrival that is the subject of designation. 193 The detention of children 194 under the DFN regime would seem to contravene the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which requires that the best interests of the child be a primary consideration in all state action concerning children, 195 and moreover, stipulates that detention of children should be "a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time." 196 This latter principle is incorporated in section 60 of the IRPA, suggesting that there is also a conflict within the terms of the Act.
Once a person is designated, they must be detained until: (a) a final determination is made to allow their claim for refugee protection or application for protection; (b) they are released by the Immigration Division under section 58; or (c) they are released as a result of a Ministerial order under section 58.1. 197 The mandatory nature of detention upon designation is a significant departure from the discretionary detention powers that operate in respect of non-DFNs. Section 55(3) of the IRPA provides that "a foreign national may, on entry into Canada, be detained" 198 if it is necessary for the completion of an examination or because of suspected inadmissibility. While Bill C-31's introduction of mandatory detention echoes the reforms initiated by the 1992 Act in Australia, it is important to recall that detention in Canada is only mandatory upon designation; that is, it remains somewhat more particularized than the approach taken in Australia whereby all unauthorized boat arrivals are subject to mandatory detention.
Initial review of a DFN's case must occur within fourteen days of designation. By section 58(1.1), on the conclusion of a review under subsection 57.1(1), the Immigration Division shall order the continued detention of the designated foreign national if it is satisfied that any of the grounds described in paragraphs (1)(a) to (c) and (e) exist, and it may not consider any other factors. 199 If release is ordered, the Immigration Division may impose any prescribed condition on the DFN. 200 If release is not ordered, further review must not occur for six months from the date of the previous review. 201 The IRPA does not impose a ceiling on the period for which a DFN may ultimately be detained. In theory, if the Immigration Division is satisfied at each review that the person falls within one of the specified categories in section 58(1), detention may be indefinite. In this respect, the amendments are similar in effect to the 1994 changes to Australia's immigration system, in which detention of asylum seekers became potential- 199 See ibid, s 58(1). Those grounds encompass satisfaction on the part of the Immigration Division that: (a) they are a danger to the public; (b) they are unlikely to appear for examination, an admissibility hearing, removal from Canada, or at a proceeding that could lead to the making of a removal order by the Minister under subsection 44(2); (c) the Minister is taking necessary steps to inquire into a reasonable suspicion that they are inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights, serious criminality, criminality or organized criminality;
...
(e) the Minister is of the opinion that the identity of the foreign national who is a designated foreign national and who was 16 years of age or older on the day of the arrival that is the subject of the designation in question has not been established. 200 See ibid, s 58(4). 201 See ibid, s 57.1(2). Further review was originally precluded for twelve months, but the government followed a recommendation by the House Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration that this be reduced to six months (see House of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, Third Report (May 2012) (Chair: David Tilson)). In contrast, section 57 provides that initial review of permanent residents and non-DFN foreign nations is to take place within forty-eight hours, then at least once more in the following seven days, and at least once more in every thirty-day period thereafter.
ly indefinite. 202 The Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations articulate a list of factors to be considered in determining whether a person is to be released from detention. 203 However, as the Immigration Review Board's Guidelines make clear, [i] f detention under the IRPA has been lengthy and there are still certain steps that must be taken in the immigration context, if valid reasons still remain to order continued detention, such as flight risk or danger to the public, an order for continued detention does not constitute indefinite detention. 204 In this context, it is to be recalled that in A v. Australia, the Human Rights Committee determined that prolonged administrative detention is a breach of article 9 of the ICCPR. 205 Similarly, the Supreme Court in Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) held that prolonged detention without meaningful review could constitute cruel and unusual punishment contrary to section 12 of the Charter. 206 As noted above, longterm detention of asylum seekers may also be viewed as a contravention of the right to hospitality.
DFNs are also subject to a suite of detrimental consequences in addition to detention. By section 20.2(1) of the IRPA, a DFN may not apply for permanent residence for five years from the date of designation; 207 where a claim or application for protection has been made, permanent residence cannot be granted until five years from the date on which a final determination is made in respect of the claim or application, as applicable. 208 This means that even persons who are granted refugee protection are unable to apply for permanent residence until five years from the date of that determination. The five-year bar also applies to applications for permanent residency on humanitarian grounds. 209 207 For reasons that have not been publicly explained, this provision appears to replicate s 11(1.1).
208 Similarly, if a foreign national who has lodged an application for permanent residence is subsequently designated a DFN, their application is suspended for five years (see IRPA, supra note 3, s 20.1(2)). Section 24(5) operates in the same way in respect of temporary resident permits. 209 See IRPA, supra note 3, s 25(1.01).
status means that DFNs are prevented from sponsoring their family members to join them for five years from the date of designation. 210 This is compounded by the inability of DFNs to obtain travel documents. Section 31.1 provides that a DFN is not "lawfully staying in Canada" for the purposes of article 28 of the Refugee Convention. The cumulative effect of these provisions is that persons deemed to be DFNs are cut off from their families for up to seven years, and possibly even longer, given that impecuniousness could preclude immediate travel. The UNHCR has observed that this outcome does not accord proper respect to the principle of family unity under international law. 211 The Canadian Bar Association has argued that "[d]enying family reunification by denial of access to [permanent resident] status is inconsistent with Article 23 of the [ICCPR] ." 212 In view of these consequences, it seems reasonable to argue that the DFN regime, in whole or in part, is punitive. A punitive regime contravenes article 31(1) of the Refugee Convention and demonstrates a deliberately inhospitable stance toward those persons for whom an absence of protection and even minimal rights may be destructive.
Fair procedure is significantly compromised as the scope for appeals by DFNs is extremely limited. The IRPA does not provide a mechanism for appeals against designation, while rights of appeal in respect of "a decision of the Refugee Protection Division allowing or rejecting the claim for refugee protection of a [DFN]" are also precluded. 213 The UNHCR has observed that the removal of merits reviews of first instance decisions risks contravention of the non-refoulement principle in the Refugee Convention. 214 In combination with mandatory detention, this policy also breaches article 9 of the ICCPR. 215 In December 2012, pursuant to section 20.1(1)(b) of the IRPA, the Minister of Public Safety designated 85 Romanians 216 who arrived in Quebec after having crossed the Canada-US border in five groups be-tween February and October 2012. 217 Given that none of the eighty-five DFNs were ever proven to be the smugglers who facilitated the Romanians' entry, it is doubtful that the designation succeeds in sending the "strong message" that the government of Canada "will take decisive action against those who earn their livelihood by criminally exploiting Canada's immigration system." 218 Instead, the designation demonstrates the actualization of the securitizing logic that undergirds Bill C-31 and distances Canada from the politics of hospitality.
C. The DFN Provisions Contravene the Charter
Perhaps the strongest indication of the extent to which an ideology of control has taken root in Canadian immigration policy is the multiple ways in which the DFN provisions infringe the Charter. As a threshold matter, the Charter is not confined to Canadian citizens or residents. Singh and Charkaoui make it clear that at the very least, rights granted by sections 7, 9, 10, and 12 219 of the Charter may be asserted by everyone who is physically present in Canada. 220 This being said, Toussaint v. Canada (AG) indicates that there are limits to the ability of non-citizens within Canada to invoke the protection of the Charter. 221 Furthermore, in a recent study of Charter cases involving non-citizens, Catherine Dauvergne concluded that the Charter has failed "to deliver on its promise of human rights protections for non-citizens. 218 Ibid. 219 Charkaoui also dealt with a claim under s 15 of the Charter. However, the Court rejected the application of section 15 to non-citizens based on section 6 (see Charkaoui, supra note 206 at para 129). The Court said that while the applicants' detentions had been lengthy, it was not divorced from the purpose of deportation (see ibid at para 131). Thus, while the possibility of a section 15 challenge remains if it can be shown that the consequences of a contravention of immigration law bears no relation to deportation, it is not a particularly fruitful line of argument and accordingly is not dealt with any further in this paper. 220 See Singh, supra note 171 at 202. sections 9 and 10(c) of the Charter. 228 By parity of reasoning, it is difficult to see how detention for six months following an administrative determination is necessary, or in furtherance of the legislative objective, which in turn suggests that such detention is arbitrary and in contravention of sections 9 and 10(c). This being said, it is arguable that the time involved in processing significant numbers of asylum seekers justifies the lengthy detention period.
Fundamental Justice
It is likely that the absence of judicial review of mandatory detention of DFNs breaches section 7 of the Charter because loss of liberty is imposed in an arbitrary manner contrary to fundamental justice; 229 in particular, the principle that persons must be able to challenge ongoing detention or the conditions of release. In the migration context, Charkaoui makes clear that a challenge "to the fairness of the process leading to possible deportation and the loss of liberty associated with detention raise[s] important issues of liberty and security" and, accordingly, engages the detainee's section 7 Charter rights. 230 The Court in that case held that judicial oversight of the process did not meet the requirements of section 7 because "the secrecy required by the scheme denie[d] the named person the opportunity to know the case" against them, thereby failing to afford the fair hearing that is required before depriving a person of life, liberty, or security. 231 In contrast, the DFN scheme does not provide for even minimal judicial scrutiny of the Minister's determination that a foreign national is a DFN. While the argument that immigration detention is not arbitrary per se might support a finding that the initial fourteen-day period of detention is valid, it is unlikely that ongoing detention without judicial scrutiny could pass constitutional muster. According to McLachlin CJ in Charkaoui:
[W]here a person is detained or is subject to onerous conditions of release for an extended period under immigration law, the detention or the conditions must be accompanied by a meaningful process of ongoing review that takes into account the context and circumstances of the individual case. Such persons must have meaningful oppor- 228 See ibid at para 91. 229 See Chaoulli, supra note 224 at paras 128-53. 230 Charkaoui, supra note 206 at para 18. The Court clarified that while deportation of a non-citizen does not in itself constitute a breach of section 7 of the Charter, the manner in which a decision to deport a non-citizen is reached may implicate that section (ibid at paras 16-17; Accord For similar reasons, the detention provisions for DFNs may infringe section 7 by reason of overbreadth. 233 The decision in R v. Heywood 234 makes clear that the doctrine of overbreadth looks to the purpose underlying a law, and considers whether the means are sufficiently tailored to meet that objective. Specifically, Heywood suggests that the question of breadth is likely to turn on the period of time deemed necessary to achieve the legislative object. 235 The government has made it clear that detention of smuggled migrants is intended to enable identification and assessment of security risks. 236 Fourteen days' detention is arguably not excessive (and therefore not overbroad) for this purpose; on the other hand, six months' detention may well be sufficiently disproportionate-that is, beyond what is necessary to achieve the legislative object-to warrant judicial intervention.
The DFN provisions may also constitute an infringement of the right to security of the person guaranteed by section 7 of the Charter because of their likely or demonstrated deleterious impact on the psychological wellbeing of designated persons. It is an established principle in Canadian law that "serious state-imposed psychological stress" can infringe security of the person for the purposes of section 7. 237 The cases thus far have applied this principle in the context of criminal law, 238 child custody, 239 and unreasonable delay by government entities. 240 There exists overwhelming evidence, much of it derived from the Australian experiment, that immigration detention, particularly indefinite detention, has disastrous effects on the mental health of detainees. 241 In addition, it is reasonable to assume that the denial of the ability to regularize one's status, combined with en-forced family separation, will have serious negative psychological effects. 242 The cumulative effect of putative or actual psychological harm by reason of the DFN provisions may in itself ground a claim under section 7 since, as the Court in Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) made clear, grossly disproportionate government responses may not satisfy the second limb of section 7, amounting to a denial of fundamental justice. 243 This being said, to the extent that a person seeking protection is found to be a security risk, psychological harm occasioned by lengthy detention appears less likely to result in a finding that the Charter has been infringed. 244 As an additional rider to the comments above concerning section 7, section 58.1 of the IRPA enables release of DFNs from detention upon the request of a DFN "if, in the Minister's opinion, exceptional circumstances exist that warrant the release"; release is also possible on the Minister's own initiative "if, in the Minister's opinion, the reasons for the detention no longer exist." The insertion of these provisions responds to the finding of the Supreme Court in Canada (AG) v. PHS Community Services Society that the existence of a potential ministerial exemption from certain consequences may protect legislation that confers discretion. 245 Thus, section 58.1 might insulate the designation provisions from a finding that they contravene principles of fundamental justice. Notwithstanding, PHS also demonstrated that even if impugned provisions are valid, the correlative exercise of discretion (including failure to act) might infringe the Charter. 246 Thus, the Minister's decision not to grant an exemption under section 58.1 could itself be arbitrary or grossly disproportionate by reason of its consequences, thereby infringing section 7. 247 This would of course necessitate consideration of the facts in relation to a particular DFN; concrete evidence that a person was operationally involved in human smuggling or terrorism might justify ongoing detention. 248 However, if the evidence put forward relies on the simple fact that a person is an asylum seeker who engaged the services of a human smuggler, this might lead to the conclusion that detention is grossly disproportionate.
